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Perspectives on ‘Lacanian subjectivities’ 
 
Derek Hook and Calum Neill 
 
Despite the fact that the quality of the literature published on Lacan in the 
English-speaking world has increased markedly in the last decade - a 
development towards which many of this issue’s participants have made notable 
contributions (Chiesa, 2007; Glynos, 2000, 2001; Leader, 2002, 2008; Leader & 
Corfield, 2007; Neill, 2006; Parker, 2005, 2007; Salecl, 2003, 2004; Stavrakakis, 
1999, 2007) – Lacanian notions of subjectivity remain, nonetheless, under-
utilized within the social sciences, cultural studies and contemporary social 
theory alike. Much of this literature has refuted the stereotypes of anti-
psychoanalytic critique – the idea that psychoanalysis inadequately understands 
the subject-to-society relation, that it remains antithetical to socio-historical 
critique, the contention that the notion of the unconscious commits one to an 
essentialist depth-psychology – successfully demonstrating the applicability of 
Lacanian thought to a variety of pressing societal, political and ideological 
dilemmas. 
 The fact that Lacanian theorizations of subjectivity are under-utilized and, 
indeed, so often misunderstood, or reduced to crude approximations, is not 
simply the fault of a uninterested readership. It is true that certain approaches to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis do result in something akin to a self-referential 
language game, where the concepts in question remain isolated from other 
realms of theorization or from non-clinical horizons of application. The aim of this 
special issue is to take up the challenge of demonstrating the practical 
application of Lacanian theory in relation to subjectivity and to do so not from a 
range of disciplinary perspectives (political studies, historiography, urban and 
spatial theory, critical psychology, performance studies, the concerns of 
pedagogy and art theory) but in a way that connects Lacanian and 
psychoanalytic thought to a variety of non-psychoanalytic theories and practices. 
 
The subject of fantasy…and enjoyment 
The paper that opens this special issue, Glynos and Stavrakakis’s ‘Lacan and 
political subjectivity’, explores the potential for political theory of the Lacanian 
notion of fantasy and the associated idea of the ‘subject of enjoyment’. The 
authors offer a number of helpful links as a means of introducing their topic. 
Through an initial consideration of critical psychology research on fantasy in the 
workplace, the authors explore a Lacanian understanding of fantasy and the 
related problematic of jouissance, using these notions to introduce a discussion 
of what we might term the ‘affective turn’ in contemporary social theory. Perhaps 
the most helpful aspects of this paper to non-initiates is the clear overview the 
authors provide of the Lacanian subject. Foremost here is the idea of the subject 
as constitutively split, as ex-centric (as ‘outside’ unto itself, as one might put it), 
or, more radically yet, as void, as not merely a lacking subject, but as 
subjectivized lack, as Chiesa (2007) helpfully puts it. Clearly, this is not a positive 
vision of the subject; lack here is a constant and inescapable condition.  
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This lack, however, must be understood as more than a morass of 
negativity, as it is sometimes, unhelpfully, presented in critical literature on 
Lacan. Against such a reductive caricature, the Lacanian understanding of the 
subject is as lacking in such a way that it leads to a sequence of ongoing 
identificatory acts which aim precisely to deliver a positive (symbolic-imaginary) 
identity to that which has no positively defined essence. Given this impetus - the 
subject’s unceasing attempts to cover over its constitutive lack - we can 
appreciate not only the persistence of fantasy - which provides an imaginary 
means of attempting to attain such impossible ends - but also, the fact, as Glynos 
& Stavrakakis insist, of the socio-symbolic dependency of subjectivity. In short, 
the constitutive impossibility of a cohesive, positive, autonomous subjectivity is 
precisely the underlying condition of possibility for the myriad imaginary and 
symbolic identifications that characterize the complexity of subjectivity. 
One of the many strengths of this paper is that it includes a valuable 
differentiation – often lacking in less textured Lacanian accounts – between the 
differing modes of jouissance. The interactions between jouissance and the 
dialectics of socio-political identification for Glynos & Stavrakakis include: 1) the 
imaginary promise of recapturing lost/impossible enjoyment; 2) limit experiences 
linked to a jouissance of the body; and 3) enjoyment as it connects to the motor 
of desire (objet petit a), the object of identification that relies on a fantasmatic 
narrative to explain a given lack of enjoyment. The last of these modalities of 
jouissance is an instrumental factor in the operation of fantasy. The logic peculiar 
to fantasy, as Glynos & Stavrakakis explain, involves the staging of a relation 
between the subject (as lack) and the object (which always evades symbolic 
capture) thereby “organizing the affective dimension of the subject, the way it 
desires and enjoys”. The advantage of this approach to fantasy is that it “links the 
‘dry’ socio-symbolic field….to the ‘sticky’ affects of the subject”.  
A further differentiation between modes of jouissance becomes important 
when the authors turn their attention to specifying different forms of subjectivity. 
The distinction between social and political subjectivity is made possible on the 
basis that the former is linked to practices conforming to current socio-political 
norms, whereas the latter contests and disputes them. The distinction between 
the ideological and ethical subject, on the other hand corresponds to the 
difference between phallic and non-phallic (or feminine) jouissance. We have in 
mind here the difference between a mode of enjoyment stemming from an 
overinvestment in a socially-configured ideal or norm, and a type of enjoyment 
linked to an awareness of the contingency of social relations, one that does not 
aim to totalize, to complete or to ‘make whole’.  
 The issue of fantasy is also of central importance in Hook’s paper, which 
takes up the notion of unconscious transactions between the subject and the 
trans-subjective social order (the Lacanian ‘big Other’) as a means of 
understanding a series of paradoxes evident within apartheid ideology. A key 
concern here revolves around the difficulty of separating historical from 
subjective agency and, moreover, with the apparent impossibility of resolving the 
contradiction of apartheid ideology as simultaneously both a carefully crafted 
ideological doctrine and a parasitic idea-system possessing the minds of its 
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hosts. Hook argues that the two modes of theorizing the subject-Other relation in 
Lacan’s Seminar XI - the processes of alienation and separation - provide a 
means of understanding how apartheid ideologues could both seemingly stand 
outside ideology (at least inasmuch as they were its authors) and yet remain 
nonetheless themselves subject to the spread of its ideas. 
By linking fantasy to the posited desire of the Other, by viewing it as the 
return-effect of the incessant line of unconscious questioning addressed to the 
Other (‘Where do I belong?’, ‘What is my role here?’, ‘What is the nature of this 
society?’, ‘What do you, the Other, want of me?’) we are able to view fantasy as 
both that which lies at the very core of subjectivity and yet also necessarily 
formulated within the parameters of the socio-symbolic order. Fantasy thus, 
according to Hook, is “both in a sense autonomous – it is the invention of the 
subject, their unconscious response to the enigma of the Other’s desire – and yet 
it is nevertheless contingent on the Other inasmuch as it is a kind of working 
hypothesis - charged with certain modes and promises of jouissance - to the 
question of the Other’s desire”. This then is perhaps the most paradoxical aspect 
of fantasy, that it is both that which, more than anything else, constitutes what is 
irreducible about us despite that it cannot ever be fully separated from the field of 
the Other. What this means, then, is that while there certainly is an element of 
symbolic determination at play within the persistence of apartheid ideology – the 
big Other of white apartheid South Africa was indeed a racist Other - this 
ideology is ultimately held aloft, recreated, reanimated by the fantasies and 
enjoyments of its beneficiaries, for which, to emphasize, such subjects remain 
fully accountable. 
 
Phobic topology and social contradiction 
Chiesa’s ‘Topology of fear’ takes as its starting point a series of intriguing but 
ultimately failed attempts at performing ‘the psychoanalysis of space’. His 
objective lies with an exposition of Lacan’s theory of phobia inasmuch as it 
proposes phobia as a particular form of symbolization, “a signifying logos that 
creates space for the phobic object”. Thus, not only does Chiesa open up a 
perspective on a particular mode of spatial subjectivity, he also advances the 
usefulness of a Lacanian understanding of the phobic. We have opted to briefly 
retrace his argument here, in the hope that such an overview will prove beneficial 
to those coming to his paper with little or no prior knowledge of Lacan. 
Chiesa begins his discussion of phobia with a consideration of the three 
crises of the Oedipus complex – frustration, privation and castration – with a 
particular emphasis being placed on the transition between the first and second 
of these crises when the child is confronted with the Desire-of-the-Mother. This is 
an exemplary instance of anxiety: the child’s potentially engulfing realization of 
the facts both of the mother’s lack and of her desire to which he or she is unable 
to adequately respond.  
 The figure of the father represents an escape route in this respect. 
Imaginary competition with the father - presumably along with the child’s 
inevitable failure in attempting to best him - institutes an authority, a paternal 
anchoring-point and, subsequently, a means of ordering the symbolic realm. The 
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child is thus provided with a way of locating themselves, a means of taking on a 
position and of grasping the meaning of their social and symbolic co-ordinates. 
This of course becomes particularly pressing when the child is confronted with 
instances of ‘the real’, those irresolvable deadlocks of experience that cannot be 
mediated with any of the tools of language and understanding he has at his 
disposal; for example, in Freud’s case of little Hans, the dawning realization of 
sexual difference and sexual desire. In the absence of such a figure of 
competition and rivalry – little Hans’s father poses him no threat and his mother’s 
desire seems all to accessible, too present – another mediator, another ‘paternal 
operator’ needs to be sought. This is one way of approaching the phobic object in 
the little Hans case: a crude signifier – for Hans, a horse – that enables a 
simultaneous re-ordering of the symbolic world and a protection from (or indeed 
a localization of) a troubling anxiety. This phobic object is to be understood along 
the lines of an empty signifier, which is to say that it has no single and fixed 
meaning, but is generatively applied in a variety of different relationships (in 
successive attempts on Hans’s part, for example, to restructure his world and 
indeed his relationship to his mother, his father, his sister, etc.). 
 It is important, as Chiesa emphasizes, that Hans’s ‘location problems’ 
have a spatial dimension. Hans’s symbolic co-ordinates have been unmoored in 
an anxiety-provoking way which impinges on his spatial security, a fact which 
suggests the pertinence of this account for an understanding of phobic spaces 
more generally. The ingenuity of Lacan’s interpretation of the little Hans case - 
and indeed of the applicability of this theorization to Mike Davis’s account of the 
phobic spaces of Los Angeles - is to be found in a reference to the Levi-
Straussian notion of the myth. According to the latter, a myth is a narrative that 
begins with an irresolvable situation, a ‘real’ impossibility, and that eventually 
yields a further contradiction at a higher level, thus both containing within itself 
and also reaching beyond the original deadlock. As Chiesa relates, Hans has two 
fantasies, one of leaving but always rejoining his mother, another of departing by 
train without his father but somehow nonetheless arriving with him. There is 
something functional about this succession of fantasies and a type of resolution 
is thus attained. A given deadlock (a return trip to the mother which never fails) is 
recapitulated at a higher level, in the form of a second fantasy which sublates the 
first (he finally succeeds in leaving with the father). What, then, is the relevance 
of this Levi Straussian logic to the myths and phobias to Davis’s account of Los 
Angeles? For Davis, fear is an ideological construction that has been imposed on 
the urban population; a mediator, an operator, a means of dealing with the ‘real’ 
deadlock of radical racial and class inequalities which cannot be either wished 
away or adequately mediated by the existing socio-symbolic frame. Unlike in 
Hans’s case, the production of phobic spaces here remains acute, pronounced. 
There is no resolution at hand. Los Angeles’s more privileged communities 
remain stuck in fear, in a situation where phobia, as Chiesa notes, naturalizes 
social contradictions.  
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Intersubjectivity and the (im)possibility of connection 
The contributions by Frosh, Neill and Baraitser and Bayly each seek to explore, 
in their own ways, questions of how it is we might, as subjects, come to, or fail to, 
relate. Frosh is concerned with the fact of language as medium necessarily 
functioning as mediator. That is, the very thing which supposedly connects us, in 
so doing, necessarily emphasizes the gap between us. Through a careful reading 
of the opening lines of Genesis, Frosh brings out the overlooked point that prior 
to the word, which is most usually seen as what is there in the beginning, there is 
not simply nothing or silence but, rather, tehom. Where tehom is usually 
understood as the deep, formless water or chaos which precedes creation, Frosh 
brings out a more nuanced translation, allowing us hear the murmur before the 
first word. This is then linked to a sense of what remains always with and yet 
always outside of language. Human speech is always accompanied, necessarily, 
with the unsaid; an unsaid which is not simply the nothing of silence but is rather 
a persistent murmuring of not yet meaning, the not yet understood. One way of 
conceptualising this something in the human subject which insists beyond 
language and understanding is through Lacan’s concept of das Ding.  
For Lacan, das Ding or the Thing refers to that which insists beyond any 
imaginary or symbolic capture or, as Lacan himself puts it, it is “the thing in its 
dumb reality” (1992). Drawing on Žižek’s use of this concept, Frosh raises crucial 
questions for our understanding of ethics and being human. Against the popular 
trend in ethical theory, fueled by readings of Levinas and his notion of the 
irreducible otherness of the other, Frosh draws on Žižek to show that that which 
lies beyond comprehension, that in the other which is truly other, is not 
necessarily the human of Levinas but might be better understood as the 
inhuman. One point which emerges here is that where a Levinasian ethics might 
be understood to stop at the point of a shared elemental - the face of the other 
for Levinas is typically demanding of a response – Žižek’s use of the concept of 
the Thing allows us to appreciate a more alien encounter, a more stringent 
alterity and this, in turn, raises crucial questions of how it is we might respond 
ethically to the other. 
These questions are, in indirect ways, picked up in the two articles which 
follow. Like Frosh, Neill is concerned with questions of relation and, specifically, 
questions of how we conceptualize the boundary between the self and the social. 
Mainstream psychology has typically sidestepped this question by supposing 
itself to have already solved it. Through recourse to Descartes’ cogito, arguably 
the prototype of modern conceptions of the self, and Husserl’s revisiting of 
Descartes in The Cartesian Meditations, Neill poses the question of how we 
might come to conceptualise intersubjectivity in a manner which does not 
effectively reduce either the self to the other or the other to the self. Drawing on 
Lacan and the Lacanian influenced theorist and artist, Bracha Ettinger, Neill 
presents an understanding of intersubjectivity which contests the traditional 
psychoanalytic concept of mother-child unity in favour of what we might 
tentatively term an originary difference. Like Frosh, Neill utilizes Lacan’s notion of 
das Ding, but this time seeking to distance it from its Žižekian overtones of horror 
and the inhuman and emphasize what might be understood to be one of Lacan’s 
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central points; that that in the other which refuses comprehension cannot, 
logically, be distinguished from that in oneself which refuses comprehension. 
Through careful analysis of key texts from Freud, Lacan and Ettinger, Neill 
suggests that our constriction by the dominant concepts in modern philosophy 
and psychology has forced us into a position where it has become all but 
impossible to think the relation of self and other without being trapped by 
seemingly common-sense notions of individuality and the naturalization of 
separateness that this suggests. Lacan’s thinking linked with Ettinger’s armoury 
of border-concepts, Neill argues, furnishes us with a fresh vocabulary which then 
brings with it fresh ways of thinking the subject-other divide. 
 
Anxious encounters 
This theme of relation is picked up again in Lisa Baraitser and Simon Bayly’s ‘On 
waiting for something to happen’ where they focus on two seemingly quite 
different contexts of encounter to question notions of the ethical or what, with 
Levinas, we might term, the response in responsibility. They do this by utilizing 
Jane Gallop’s anecdotal theory approach wherein an anecdote is recounted and 
then worked through to draw out the theoretical insights it might offer. The first 
two anecdotes in the paper concern experiences of therapy sessions; one in 
which one of the authors, as therapist, begins to faint and slide from her chair 
and, the other, in which the other author, as analysand, reacted to a comment 
from their therapist with the sensation of having their ‘spine plugged in’. The 
second group of anecdotes relate secondhand accounts of a performance by the 
Italian performance artist Franko B. whose performances typically involve an 
exposition of vulnerability through nakedness and, until recently, controlled 
bleeding. In the performance in question, 2002’s Aktion 398, Frank B. staged 
intimate one-to-one encounters wherein each ‘audience’ member shared two 
minutes with him in a closed room. All the anecdotes, therefore, relate to the idea 
of relating in one-to-one situations, situations in which those present might be 
understood to be drawn to respond to the other and situations in which those 
present might be understood to be drawn to a sense of responsibility towards the 
other present there. 
Drawing on a range of theorists, from Lacan to Levinas, from Badiou to 
Agamben, Baraitser and Bayly forge a meaning from their anecdotes which sees 
a conjunction between the analytic session and the theatrical performance, which 
foregrounds what they term the ‘liveness’ in each encounter. This notion of 
liveness, which has its roots Philip Auslander’s thesis on the problematic 
distinction between live and mediatized performances, is developed here as an 
important new concept in thinking the ethics of encounter and helps us 
understand something central to analytic experience, the potential for reaching 
out and across to the other. 
Encounter and perhaps even something like Baraitser and Bayly’s 
liveness are key too in the experience of Antony Gormley’s Blind Light, the 
exhibition held at the Hayward Gallery in the summer of 2007. Central to the 
exhibition was the piece Blind Light itself, a 8m by 10m glass box filled with a 
dense cloud-like vapour and lit with fluorescent light. Visitors to the Gallery were 
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allowed, twenty-five at a time, to enter the box and wander in its space, inevitably 
encountering each other as they did, but encountering each other in a manner 
quite different from usual. With the vapour, it was impossible to see your own 
hand nevermind your neighbour. This meant that collision was all but 
unavoidable. The effect was that, in this strange space, you moved precariously, 
bumping repeatedly into strangers who remained conventionally strangers while 
at the same time becoming intimate fellow travelers. 
As well as being a renowned artist, Antony Gormley is also deeply 
interested in psychoanalytic ideas. We are very lucky to be able to include in this 
special edition a transcription of a discussion between Antony and three key 
figures in the world of psychoanalytic writing; Darian Leader, Renata Salecl and 
Susie Orbach. The discussion took place shortly after the Blind Light exhibition 
closed and, thus, takes as its starting point experiences of that and, what we 
might understand as its companion piece, Event Horizon, the collection of life 
sized figures which were stood on buildings and bridges around the Hayward 
Gallery. Not only does the discussion offer important insights into Antony 
Gormley’s work, but also, focusing on ideas of anxiety and connection from a 
psychoanalytic, and primarily Lacanian, perspective, it echoes many of the ideas 
and themes discussed in more depth elsewhere in this issue. 
Following Glynos and Stavrakakis’s and Hook’s discussions of fantasy 
and its relation to the social, in ‘Public Space and the Body’ Renata Salecl points 
us towards the precarity of fantasy, suggesting that the experience of Blind Light 
can function to disorientate not only our spatial awareness but that it can unsettle 
our very experience of reality, a reality which, as we have discovered, is always 
necessarily supported by fantasy. Salecl links this experience to anxiety and, in 
understanding her discussion here, the reader would be well served to return to 
Chiesa’s paper where he clarifies the distinction between fear and anxiety, that  
“[anxiety] is the subject's confrontation with the lack [absence] of object, in which 
he is swallowed up"  (Lacan, Seminar IV, 345-6). We can see here, perhaps, a 
direct evocation of Blind Light and it is in this anxious space that we might find 
echoes of the murmur to which Frosh points, the unspoken which accompanies 
our relating to others and, to link this with Neill’s argument, the murmur we hear 
in ourselves. As Antony Gormley puts it, “We need art as a space in which we 
can familiarise ourselves the incommensurable, the unknowable, the unseeable 
both within ourselves and in space at large and escape from the dominance of 
visible symbolic orders.”   
 
Negativity against knowledge 
The brief article that closes the issue, Parker’s review of the recently translated 
Seminar XVII, ‘The other side of psychoanalysis’, lists a series of Lacan’s 
warnings against a series of lures – those of mastery, individuality and truth - that 
stem from treating psychoanalysis as an idealized form of knowledge. What is 
intriguing about this seminar is the extent to which Lacan takes on and extends a 
series of critiques that psychoanalysis is often presumed to have ignored, 
including the dynamics of institutional-spatial power-relations, the blunt 
application of psychoanalytic models to history, and the universalizing 
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prescription of the Oedipus complex. More striking yet is the degree to which 
Lacan proves willing to use these critiques psychoanalytically – in line, that is, 
with the psychoanalytic imperative of destabilizing illusions of understanding, 
mastery and individual agency - against certain trends within psychoanalysis 
itself.  
Parker concludes with a twofold cautioning, which perhaps makes for an 
appropriate ending to this issue as a whole. He is concerned not only with a 
routine problem underlying the attempt to turn subjectivity into viable forms of 
knowledge, that is, the transformation of critique into “something…marketable 
and useful”, but also with the possibility that we might neglect “the negativity of 
psychoanalysis” as precisely a means of challenging and over-turning such 
“idealized forms of knowledge”. 
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